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t. 
TOWARD PURE LEGAL EXISTENCE: BLACKS AND THE 
CONSTI TUTION* 
By 
J. Clay Smith, Jr.** 
Although the Constitution was at best imperfect ••• 
If interpreted justly, in full awareness of today's 
conditions, and if applied in a consis~ent fashion, 
the Constitution can be converted into a document of 
liberation for black America.ll 
The Negro was brought to America as a slave in 1619. Since the day 
Blacks landed on the shores at Jamestown, law and custom have significantly 
influenced their lives. The constitutions of the various states of the 
Union and the U.S. Constitution have been interpreted in many ways in years 
past to limit the progress of Blacks in the American society. Consti tu-
tiona1 interpretations by the courts and legislative enactments by men and 
women of good will have also advanced the position of Blacks in the American 
, 
society. The question today is: How is the Constitution of the United 
States to be interpreted as relates to the interest of Black Americans? 
This is a most compelling question as Americans celebrate the bicentennial 
anniversary of the United States Constitution. 
* This paper was presented on June 18, 1987, at the Distinguished Lecture 
Series of the Schomburg Center for Research in Black CUlture, The New York 
Public Labrary, commemorating the Bicentennial of the United States Consti-
tution. 
** Dean of the Howard University School of Law. He received the A.B. 
degree from Creighton University in 1964; the J.D. degree from Howard 
Univiersity School of Law in 1967; the IL.M. and S.J.D. degrees from the 
George Washington National Law Center in 1970 and 1977, respectively. 
~ F. McKiSSick, 3/5 of a Man 55 (1969). 
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In Colonial.America, the American Negro landed at Jamestown in the 
Fall of 1619. During the next three hundred years, the American Negro was 
systematically separated fram the white population by both law and custom. 
In fact, the law was used as a tool for social engineering to reduce the 
~ 
Negro fran the fuetaphysical classification of human to that of chattel, 
f 
from an original classification of freedan to the status of slavery. 
A. 
Toward Pure Legal Existence 
The bicentennial of the Oonstitution is an important celebration for 
this nation. Its celebration is for all Americans. During this celebra-
tion, people fran all regions, age and ethnic groups, and political persua-
sions, will provide greater insight and historical perspective on the meaning 
of the Oonstitution. The discussions, indeed the debates, that will ensue 
regarding its interpretation, will no doubt strengthen our collective judg-
ment, renew our faith in what the Oonstitution represents to the world, 
and strengthen our determination to have it live up to its tenets for all 
Americans. 
Black Americans join the nation in celebrating the bicentennial of 
our instrument of rule. However, this year will cause Black Americans to 
speak the truth about the agony, and violence, the human disregard, the 
ignorance, and the econanic and htnnan despair resulting fran the exclu-
sion of Blacks from the definition of legal existence. The fact that 
Blacks were excluded fran the definition and the panoply of causal effects 
can be easily documented. 
While many Americans will dwell on the writings and political activi-
ties of Jefferson, Madison, Jay, and leading contemporary constitutional law 
scholars, many Black Americans will use this bicentennial year to honor the 
-3-
unsung national heroes and heroines, the men and wanen of color who were 
deprived of their liberty by the phantom whims of segregated systems whose 
doors closed to other than white faces. 
Professor y/illiam Robert Ming appropriately reminds us that liThe 
J 
legal status of Negroes ••• cannot be detennined solely by reference to 
the written sources of law [such as the Constitution because] they do not 
entirely disclose the real legal status of Negroes."2/ Professor Ming 
chides us to remember that the words of the Oonstitution are no more than 
v-ords. Professor Ming asserts that "it is the law in operation which 
determines the real legal status of Negroes."~ One can hardly disagree 
with Ming's assessment that no discussion of change in the legal status 
of Blacks can occur without evaluation of the law in operation. 
I wish to assert a belief that urges, if not compels, acceptance 
among cansti tutional scholars of America. It is this: The deCision by 
the Framers to allow slavery after the ratification of the United States 
Consti tution was a moral flaw in the (bnsti tution • It was morally wrong, 
and further, 
To the extent that the uneven and disparate application of 
the law has left any notion of the lack of the worth and 
human dignity of black people, or has interfered in any way 
with their natural right to freely partiCipate in a republic 
born on a philosophical base that all men are created equal 
under law -- to that extent, black people have been denied a pure 
legal existence. Pure legal existence looks to the future but 
studies the present and the past of the law that touches black 
2/ Ming, "legal Status," The Integration of the Negro Into American 
Society 197 (1951). 
~ Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
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people~and those similarly situated, in order to trace, to 
ascertain, and to analytically assess the growth of how near 
they are to an existence which is free fran racial discrimina-
tion. Pure legal existence, then, is an existence, under law, 
" whic~'is barren of racial discrimination in law and in its appli-
t' , 
cation; it encompasses being in a society in which the accouter-
ments of slavery are no more.4/ 
B. 
The Mauri Doctrine 
On May 6, 1987, Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered a speech com-
manorating the bicentennial in Mauri, Hawaii. In this speech, now referred 
to as "The Mauri Doctrine," Mr. Justice Marshall reminded the world that 
the Cbnstitution, when adopted as our instrument of rule, was defective. 
What was the defect? When adopted, the United States Cbnstitution 
contained three provisions regarding Black people. One provision, Article 
4, Section 2c, provided that fugitive slaves were to be returned to their 
masters. The second provision, Article l, Section 2C, concerning Cbngres-
sional representation, stated that in determining Cbngressional represen-
tation, three-fifths of the slave population was to be added to the free 
lJOpula tion. Sane have argued that the three-fifths rule constitutionally 
defined Black people as property, as subordinate to the more exclusive 
definition of a person afforded to all others whose skin was white. The 
third provision, Article 1, Section 9, a compromise between the Southern 
and Northern interest, sanctioned the African slave trade for twenty years. 
As Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall said: 
No doubt it will be said when the unpleasant truth of the 
history of slavery in America is mentioned during this 
if Smith, Memoriam to Frank D. Reeves, 'lbwards a Houstonian School of 
Jurisprudence and the Study of Pure legal Existence, 18 How. L.J. 1, 5 (1973). 
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", 
bicentennial year J that the Consti tutiOll was a product of 
its timet?, and embodied a canpromise which, under other 
circumstances would not have been made. But the effects 
of the Framers' canpromise have remained for generations. 
They arose from the contradiction between guaranteeing 
liberty and justice to all, and denying both to Negroes.51 
As Americans celebrate the bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion and the Sigqlficant acts that took place in Philadelphia two hundred 
: 
years ago, Mr. Justice Marshall reminds America that it cannot lose sight of 
the reality of the conditions which gave rise to the enslavement of Black 
human beings. Americans cannot and must not be allowed to celebrate the 
two hundredth birthdate of our instrument of rule, without remembering that 
it denied constitutionally ordered liberty to Black people. If we forget, 
and if the nation forgets the effects the denial of liberty caused in the 
mdsery, the suffering, and the inhuman brutality on Black people, then, the 
national celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the United States 
COnstitution may well be a disingenuous celebration.61 
The ink on Mr. Justice Marshall's speech had not dried before it was 
criticized as an unfair and narrow portrayal of the Framers of the Oonstitu-
tion. However, as hard as it is for sane Americans to swallow, 71 Mr • 
51 Ranarks of Justice Thurgood Marshall, At the Annual Seminar of the San 
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association In Mauri, Hawaii, May 6, 1987 
at 5-6. (Hereafter Mauri Doctrine). 
61 Id. at 8. See Marshall, An Evaluation Of Recent Efforts To Achieve Racial 
Integration In Fduca tion Through Resort To The Oourts, 21 J. Negro Ed. 316-327, 
335-336 (1952). (Denial in area of education discussed by Thurgood Marshall.) 
7 I See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall's (bnsti tution, The Detroit News, May 10, 
1987, at A22, col. 1; Yoder, That 'Defective' Constitution, Wash. Post, May 
14, 1987, at A25, col. 1; Francis, Wisdan Marshall could have used, Wash. 
Times, May 15, 1987, at 3D, col. 1; Goldwin, Why Blacks, Wanen and Jews are 
not Mentioned in the Constitution, Commentary, May, 1987 at 28; Hodel, In 
Defense of Constitution, N.Y. T~es, May 13, 1987, at A20, col. 1; Constitu-
tion Defended From Marshall Criticism, Los Angeles Sentinel, May 28, 1987, 
at Al6, col. 4; July, Oonsti tution Wasn't About Justice, but Order, N.Y. 
T~es, May 31, 1987, at E28, col. 4; Waite, People's Slavery, N.Y. Times, 
June 12, 1987 , at A30, col. 4. See also, D. Bell, Race, Racism and American 
Law 49-50 (1973) (quoting S. Lynd, Slavery And The Founding Fathers 119-131 
(M. Drimner, ed. 1968» for a different view on why the word "slave" was 
not used in the COnstitution. 
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Justice Thurgood Marshall is correct in his assertion that the Framers of 
the Cbnstitution intentionally excluded Blacks from the reaches of consti-
tutional guarantees, thereby rendering the document flaWed.~/ The views 
of Justice Marshatl are ~portant to any national debate on the original 
1 
intent of the Cbristi tution. As the first and only Black American to s1 t on 
the United States SUpreme Court his views should cause Americans to face 
the fact that our Constitution, for wba tever reason, made slavery a legally 
permissible status. 
How could Justice Marshall, trained at Howard Uni versi ty School of law, 9/ 
allow this year to pass without reminding the nation of the truth? If Justice 
Marshall had remained Silent, if he had allowed the apologists to bury the 
truth, he would have betrayed the teachings of his mentor Dr. Charles Hamil ton 
Houston, 10/ the efforts of his life's work and tha t of other Black lawyers, and 
~ See, e.g., Mauro, Burger on Constitution: 'It isn't perfect.' USA Today, 
at 1, col. 2; Justice Marshall's Critique, Wash. Post, May 9, 1987, at A22, 
col. 1; Gilliam, Constitutional Outrage, Wash. Post, May 18, 1987, at C3, 
col. 5; Payne, A Flawed Constitution, Wash. Afro-American, May 19, 1987, 
at 5, col. 1; Molotsky, Slavery Issue Adds Vigor to Debate, N • Y. Times, 
May 21, 1987, at A22, col. 4; Jacob, Celebrating the Bicentennial, Wash. 
Afro-American, May 26, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Cohen, The Q)nstltution Through 
Marshall • s Eyes, Wash. Post, May 12, 1987 , at Al9, col. 1; Fleming, The 
Constitution, Wash. Afro-American, May 30, 1987 , at 5 col. 1; Kamen, Marshall 
Blasts Celebration of Constitution Bicentennial, Wash. Post, May 7, 1987, 
at 1, col. 1; Observing the Constitution, Wash. Afro-American, June 2, 1987, 
at 4, col. 1 ; Keith, The Celebration of a Living Ibcument, The Detroit News, 
June 2, 1987, at 8A, col. 1. 
W Thurgood Mlxshall was graduated from Howard University School of Law 
in 1933. 
lQJ See G. R. McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamil ton Houston and the Struggle 
for Civil Rights 77-79 (1983); reviewed by Smith, Forgotten Hero, 98 
Han. L. Rev. 482, 487, n. 27 (1984); R. IO.uger, Simple Justice 131 (1976). 
See also, J. M. Langston, II The Intellectual, Moral, and Spiritual Chndi tion 
of the Slave," Autographs Of Freedan 147 (J. Griffith, ed., 1854). (Marshall's 
prinCiples draw on those of John Mercer Langston, who, in 1854 stated, "The 
American slave is a htnnan being. II In 1868, langston became the first dean of 
Howard University School of Law.) 
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laymen alike, who contributed so significantly to cure an inchoate document.ll/ 
C. 
Constitutional Fear and Bifurcation of Blacks 
The Frwner~ of the Constitution attempted the ~possible: they 
l;' 
i 
. . 
attempted to dehy the human eX1stence of Black people. However, the exis-
tence of the slave could not be denied, even though he could assert no rights 
under his sta tus as property. The Framers of the (bnsti tution bifurcated 
the slave and granted a limited existence for the commercial and political 
benefit of persons other than h~self. Legal existence being denied, Black 
people were rendered powerless to defend their person, their property or to 
stake out a cla~ in a nation that considered them legally invisible. 
D. 
Reversion to Originally Free Status Created Fear 
It was the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution that 
slavery would end in 1808. However, once slavery was legalized in the 
nation it was not to be easily dislodged -- not even on moral grounds. 
If one were white, rights to life, liberty and property in the State 
were claimed to be naturally endowed by God. However, if one were 
Black, rights were not natural. Black people were not considered 
originally free.l2/ If slaves were to revert to their 
l!/ See Hastie, The Proposition of the Negro in the American Social Order, 8 
J. Negro Ed. 595 (1939); A. L. Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color 
(1978) ; P. Finkelman, Slavery In The Courtroan 3-15 (1985). 
12/ See e.g. The Jewish Record, January 23, 1863, quoted in B.W. KOrn, 
American Jewry and the Civil War 27 (1951) (contending that Blacks were not 
originally free); But see J M. Willis, "The Bible Versus Slavery," Autographs 
of Freedom 151 (J. Griffiths, ed., 1854); J. H. Oone, A Black Theology of 
Liberation, 90-94 (1986) (Cone writes, "The being of the human person as freedan 
is expressed in the Bible in tenns of the image of God."); Nelson, The Impact 
of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth 
Century America J 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 525-536 (1974) (arguing that the moral 
and political elements of antislavery thought merged into a single antislavery 
Jurisprudence) • 
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originally free status, a belief always held by Blacks, this would have 
vested them with the srune rights and privileges as whites. The thought of 
such reversionary rights created fears against Blacks. Sane believed that 
Blacks posed dang~rs to the Sta te and such discourse was used to prolong 
0: 
J 
the institution df slavery. 
According to some documentation in Albert J. Beveridge t s Life of John 
Marshall, Marshall himself might have believed that Blacks threatened the 
State. In a letter Marshall wrote to Reverend R. R. Gurley in 1831, he said, 
The removal of our colored population is, I think, a 
camnon object, by no means confined to the slave states 
although they are more immediately interested in it. The 
whole Union would be strengthened by it, and relieved 
from a danger whose extent can hardly be estimated.l~1 
One author has asked: " What was this terrible danger which ••• 
threatened the cOl.Ultry through the colored population?"l41 She concludes 
"that amalgamation was one probable fear, and the other ••• was social 
canmingling."l51 Hence, white people feared integration of Blacks into 
American life as a matter of social, political and economic principle 
which provided the legal basis for the classification of Blacks as legally 
impotent. 
The expansion of social status of many in the South was predicated on 
131 A.J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, Vol. IV, at 475 (1919), quoted 
by Thelma D. Ackiss, II The Negro and The Supreme Court To 1900, n Misters 
Thesis, Howard Uni versi ty, 1936 , at 36 (hereafter Acldss). Ms. Ackiss was 
graduated from The Howard University School of Law in 1931. 
141 Id. at 36. 
151 Ibid. 
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the possessory interest, protected by law, of Black people. As J. E. Caines 
wrote, 16/ 
[S]lavery in the South is something more than a moral and 
poli~cal principle; it has become a fashionable taste, a 
f 
social passion. The possession of a slave in the South carries 
with it the same sort of prestige as the possession of land in 
this country, as the possession of a horse among Arabs; it 
brings the owner into connection with the privileged class and 
forms a presumption that he has attained a certain social position. 
It is my belief that it was this very presumption that worked its way 
into the framing of the Constitution in the bifurcation of slaves as 
, 
property and as persons for reasons unrelated to their legal existence. This 
was an act that defied reason and nullified the very words of the Declara-
tion of Independence: "We hold these Truths that all Men are created 
equal ••• " 17/ 
16/ J. E. caines, The Slave Power 90 (1862) (quoted by Ackiss, supra note 13, 
at 37). Some Blacks were freed by their masters or otherwise gained their 
freedom before the Elnancipa tion Proclamation in 1863. However, the operation 
of the law and custom did not advance their status or the fullness of their 
legal existence. See Free Blacks In America, 1800-1860, at 24, (B.M. Rudwick, 
ed., 1970). See also, C.G.Woodson, A Century of Negro Migration 37-38 (1918) 
(statistics of the free colored population of the United States 1850 and 1860). 
Id. at 39-60 (regarding the passage of Black Codes in the North to limit the 
legal existence of free Blacks.) 
17/ D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 45-47 (1973). M. F. Berry, Black 
Resistance to White Law 7-18 (1971), reviewed by Higginbotham, Race, Racisn and 
American Law, 122 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1044 (1974). 
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E. 
Legal Existence Slowed Under Early Supreme Court Developments 
There crume a ttme that states such as Virginia and Kentucky drew up 
resolutions drafted by Jefferson and Madison in 1798, to 1~it Cbngress' 
1 
authority to ex.trcise its powers. It was believed that such resolutions 
t 
t 
were designed to protect the institution of slavery. Even Cllief Justice 
John Marshall himself is thought to have shared the beliefs that the 
authori ty of the federal government should be limited. However, Chief 
Justice Marshall "soon brought the country around to the pasi tion of think-
ing that although the federal government is one of enumerated powers, that 
govermnent and not that of the states is the judge of the extent of its 
powers and, 'though limited in its powers, is suprane' within its sphere 
of action."lSI Justice Marshall in redemptive fashion went on to write 
that "there is no phrase in the instrument ••• which excludes incidental 
or implied p:>wers; and which requires that everything granted shall be 
expressly and minutely described."191 
Marshall's decisions are important to the crusade of Black Americans 
because, though not imnediate, his view that the Constitution was the 
Supreme Law of the Land, and not subordinate to dictates of the States 201 
would sanction legislative acts passed to secure and to protect the civil 
rights of Black Americans.211 
181 C. G. Woodson, Fifty Years of Negro Citizenship As Qualified By The United 
States SUpreme G:>urt, 6 J. of Negro History 1, 2 (1921) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland 17 U.S. (4 \Vheat.) 316, 404, (lS19). The page referred to by Woodson 
(416) is an error. 
191 Id. at 2, at 404. 
201 Cooper v. Aaron, 35S U.S. 1,4, lS-19 (195S). 
211 See e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. 
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960). 
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It was not "until after John Marshall of Virginia became Chief Justice, 
are to be found cases involving Negro rights." 22/ A careful review of the 
cases involving Blacks during the period that Chief Justice Marshall was 
on the U. s. Supr~e Court did not disclose a chronology of cases which gave 
j 
meaning to the Idgal existence of Black people. The death of Justice 
Marshall in 1835 would usher in Joseph Story as Olief Justice and, to some 
extent the abandonment of ~~shallts view of a strong central government. 
The nation drifted towards the supremacy of local governments and Black 
people drifted toward an extended period of legal non-existence.231 
In 1836, Roger Taney was confinned as Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court. He served in that capacity until his death in 1864. 
While Taney may be credited with developing certain aspects of American 
jurisprudence, scholars who support his work, his opinion, and that of the 
majori ty of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford ,241 did little to advance 
the legal existence of Black people. 
In the Ored Scott decision, Chief Judge Taney posed a question touch-
, 
ing the metaphysical intent of the Framers of the Constitution. It was 
this: "Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into the country, and 
sold as slaves, becane a member of the political conmuni ty fonned and 
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as 
such became entitled to all the rights and privileges, and ~unities 
guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?" 25/ The answer to the ques-
221 Ackiss, supra note 13, at 1-106. (These cases are discussed in some 
detail in this excellent thesis.) 
23/ e.G. Woodson, supra note 18, at 10. 
241 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 1857. 
251 Id. at 403. 
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tion posed was "Kb. II The answer to this question by the court is ample 
evidence that Black people were viewed as non-beings as a matter of juris-
prudential thought. To be a person under the Constitution, one had to be 
a citizen; to bi a citizen, one had to be a person. Since both the words 
" . ,
ci tizen and person were described by Mr. Justice Taney to be "synonanous 
tenns,II261 Black people did not fall within the legal definition of consti-
tutional metaphysics. Then, what rights, duties or obligations were granted 
to the creatures of the African race under the moral ~peratives stated in 
the Chnsti tution? The answer from the pen of Mr. Chief Justice Taney would 
forever cast a cloud over the most revered branch of our nation's government. 
Even as Taney tried to further debase Blacks, he could not write about them 
without admitting that Blacks were "regarded as beings [although] of an 
inferior order ••• "271 Taney sealed the fate of Blacks under the Cbnstitution 
wi th words that rang out across the land. His words were as follows: 
[Blacks] had for more than a century before been regarded 
as beings of an inferior order, and although unfit to asso-
ciate with the white race either in social or political re-
lations; and so far inferior that they had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his 
benefit.2S1 
261 Id. at 404. 
2:l lId. at 407. 
2131 Ibid. 
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F. 
Legal Existence Granted Blacks 
On January 1, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln anancipated the slaves 
1 
by Proclamation. } However, according to Cbnstance Baker M:>tley, this Procla-
t 
t 
mation was "a nullity."291 In 1963, she wrote that the Proclamation "was 
intended to free only those slaves in states or parts of states which, on 
January 1, 1863, were still in rebellion against the United States."301 
Slavery in non-rebellious states retained its previous legal status causing 
the need for a Constitutional Amendment. 
In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified and made part of the 
Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment, the first "Negro Amendment", breath-
ed legal life into a newly freed Black American. It made involuntary ser-
vitude a federal cr~e. 
On July 28, 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment granted the status of citizen-
Ship to Blacks and cured the metaphysical flaw that denied legal existence 
and federal protection to Blacks in the states in which they resided. 
Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment has been described as lithe Negro's 
charter of liberty." 311 However, it and the other Negro Amendments were 
more than a charter of liberty. The Negro Amendments provided grants of 
legal existence heretofore denied to Blacks by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion. These Amendments would gradually move macks towards pure legal 
existence in our constitutional democracy. 
291 Motley, The Chnsti tution -- Key to Freedom, 28 Ebony 221 (Sept. 1963). 
301 Ibid. 
311 B. H. Nelson, "The Fourteenth Amendment And The Negro Since 1920," Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Catholic University, at 1 (1946). See also, J.A. Cobb, liThe 
Consti tutional Rights of the Negro or Race Distinctions in American law, 11 in 
F. Styles, Negroes and the Law 63-87 (1937). 
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The grant of legal being to Black people was an act that would not im-
mediately end the legitimacy of slavery in the minds of whites in many 
southern states. For, after all, it remained their view that the white man 
was not requir~~ to treat Blacks as equals or to protect them as such. 
1 
Whi tes feared Blacks -- as Chief Justice Marshall had written. They feared 
the exercise of the very political freedoms cla~ed when the nation was 
formed and the (bnsti tution was written. This was especially true in the 
exercise of the franchise. For example, on December 16, 1868, the Houston 
Telegraph gave the following advice to Negro freedmen in Texas: 
You are aware that a very large majority of the white 
people of Texas are opposed to allowing all of you to 
vote, because they do not think you are qualified to 
exercise this high privilege. If the Convention should 
confer suffrage upon you it will be the very cause of its 
being taken away fran you after awhile, and we believe 
that it would deprive you of it forever.32/ 
Shortly thereafter, one C.W. Bryant, a Black member of the Texas Legis-
la ture, responded thusly, 
Now Sir, I ask one thing: Why is it that the white 
people are crying daily, 'Let us vote?' 
If a free man can live so well in a free country without 
a voice in the Govermnent, why not try it yourself for 
awhile? 
32/ J. Mason Brewer, Negro Legislators of Texas 23-24 (1935). 
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,. 
No Sir; give us the ballot and give it to us for all 
time, and then if you can outrun us in the race of life, 
all is well.33/ 
By 1905 the Black voter in Texas was disfranchised. Again the fear 
it 
1 
that Blacks would: rise up and claim their original legal existence caused 
political alarm. As one author described the disfranchisement of Blacks 
in Texas: 
As the Negro became more infonned and better educated, and 
more accustomed to contending for his rights and getting 
some of them, and as he became more conscious of his power 
wi th the ballot, the white Texan became more and more alanned 
and disturbed over the Negro vote, and its power in the hands 
of the colored man.34/ 
In 1869, one of the most significant tmportant decisions of the 
Post-Reconstruction period was decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia, 
White v. Clements.35/ The bare facts are these: a black man was elected 
Clerk of the Court in Olatham County, Georgia, in 1868. He beat a white 
contender. The "real vital question at issue" was whether a "person of 
color [was competent under the law] to hold office in [Georgia] •••• " 36/ 
The trial court had ruled for the white plaintiff holding that a Black 
person was not competent under law to hold public office. 
33/ Ibid. H.L. Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote 215 (1948); 
Kousser, "The Undennining of the first Reconstruction," Minority Vote 
Dilution 27-46 (D. Chandler, ed., 1984). 
34/ Id. at 113. 
35/ 39 Ga. 232 (1869). 
36/ Id. at 241. 
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.. 
In one of the most unusual cases in the South during this period, the 
Georgia Supreme Court, speaking through Justice McCay, held for the Black 
incumbent. Why do I draw attention to this decision? First of all, White v. 
Clements laid theJfoundation for the right of Black Americans to hold public 
J 
office in the Sta~e of Georgia. Secondly, the decision casts light on the 
state of mind, perhaps even the minds of the drafters of the Federal Consti-
tution, that Black people, though persons, had no legal existence, and that 
the distinction between white and Black rights was derived from D1vine Right. 
In short, God did not grant to persons of color any legal status; therefore, 
white people owed Blacks only such rights as were specifically granted to 
them by the legislature. This notion was explained in Justice McCay's 
opinion. There Justice MCcay says, 
••• it is still that the case of the Negro stand upon 
a different footing, and that however it may be true, that 
the rights of a white American citizen came from God, yet 
a black American citizen cannot cla~ this presumption; 
that the rights of the Negro have a different derivation, 
they, came from the State, and they can have none, except 
such as he can show chapter and verse for.371 
Justice McCay, while rejecting this viewpoint, considered the his-
torical argument raised by the white plaintiff attempting to disqualify 
the Black incumbent who beat ~ in the election. Justice Mccay wrote:3S1 
371 Id. at 247. 
381 Ibid. 
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The Negro, they say, was, as all admi t, a slave, without 
any rights, save as were specially pointed out by law, and 
that having none, became free by special grant, he does 
not sta~d like a white man, with every right, that is not 
}. i 
expresSly denied, but with only such as are specially granted. 
Mccay continued ,391 
••• in this State [so it was argued] we are to have two 
classes of citizens, one holding their rights by divine 
gift from the God of nature, in favor of whom there always 
exists the presumption that any particular right contended 
for, whether it be legal or political, and in reference to 
whom, the burden of proof is always against the party deny-
ing the right; and another class, whose rights cane not 
from God, but fran society, and who in every contest respect-
ing a right, must be able to show by special enactment, that 
the right has been granted. 
Ironically, even though Justice Mccay rej ected the Di vine Right of 
people based on race, he held that the Reconstruction statutes by the 
national government "recognized [the black incumbent] as a part of the 
sovereign people of the State ••• [and therefore Blacks were] entitled to 
the same presumption as are other fellow citizens ••• "4QI His decision is 
bottaned, not only on the practical liberty of man, but on the statutory 
recognition or grant of the equality of Blacks by authority derived fram 
the national COnstitution. 
391 Ibid. 
401 Id. at 255 (original emphasis). 
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Hence, thirty-eight years after Chief Justice Marshall raised the fear 
of the liberation of black people in America, a Justice of the Georgia 
Suprane Court, interpreting that same Constitution, held that to fear the free-
dan of Black peoJe was to reject the peace and good order of the State.4l/ 
r --
G. 
Attainment of Color-Blind Society via Legal Wars 
Despite the refusal of the United States Supreme Q>urt to grant social 
equality to Blacks in Plessy v. Ferguson,42/ the decision did produce a 
dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan that would prospectively cause Americans to 
wonder whether the Oonstitution was color-blind.43/ 
The history of the legal wars fought by Blacks and whites to secure 
a SOCial, economic and poli tical color-blind society in America are well 
known. These wars waged on several legal fronts concerned the existence 
of Black people. While there is no longer doubt that Blacks are both 
.' 
"citizens and persons" within the public legal definition of those teImS, 
same constitutional scholars have refused to accept, actively tried to 
contain, or to rewrite the definition using the srune arguments that 
41/ Id. at 269. 
42/ 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
43/ Id. at 556. 
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perfected it.44/ 
Much of the resistence to change was due to the refusal of whites to 
accept the fact that Blacks were human. Same clung to the notion of Divine 
Right, which gave }~i tes absolute p:>wer over Blacks as their subj ects. 
i 
Others were afraitl that Blacks would cane to know, understand and collec-
tively assert the very constitutional rights so long denied them, and 
ul tima tely lead to a restructuring of the whole society. Many feared this 
possibility. 
TO the credit of America, the institution of slavery was outlawed. 
However, race remained the badge of slavery which, for most Blacks, could 
not be hidden. Slavery and what it meant to white men remained in the 
minds of Blacks and compelled them to systematically turn to the Courts 
to seek a pure legal existence. 
Politically, Blacks have had to seek judicial relief to thwart the 
efforts of those who sought to deny them the right to vote,45/ the right 
to serve on juries,46/ and the dignity of even sitting in the courtrooms 
~ -
of this nation.47/ The effects of slavery kept Black children from obtain-
44/ See Sni th, EdWin Meese on the Suprane Court, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1986, 
at A26, col. 4; Taylor, Meese and the Supreme Court: He Deals with Critics 
by Softening His Ranarks, N. Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at Al6, col. 1; 
Glasser, Cooper v. Aaron [358 U. S. 1 (1958)]: Wba t Did M3ese Mean? Wash. 
Post, Nov. 24, 1986, at Al4, col. 5; Kurtz, Meese's View on Court Rulings 
Assailed, Defended, Wash. Post, Oct. 2A, 1986, at Al2, col. 1; Meese, The lawman, 
Calls for Anarchy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, at E23, col. 1; Meese, The Tulane 
Speech : What I Meant, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1986 , at A21, col. 4; Mr. Meese 
Replies, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1986, at A26, col. 1; Abrams, So Much for Meese's 
'Original Intention,' N.Y. T~es, June 4, 1987, at A27, col. 1. 
45/ Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
46/ Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
47/ Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). 
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ing a competitive education in the South,481 and relegated them to inferior 
educations in other sections of the nation.491 Race restricted Blacks 
from gaining an education in public, graduate, and professional schools,501 
to purchase ham~s in white communities,5l1 and exposed them to prosecution 
j 
for marrying anon-Black person.52/ The effects of slavery have caused 
labor unions to refuse to represent Blacks in labor disputes,531 and cities 
to refuse Blacks the use of public recreational facilities,54 I even libraries.551 
If one should doubt that there existed a national effort to limit the 
legal existence of Blacks, one need only refer to the exhaustive compilation 
of States' Laws on Race and Color by Dr. Pauli Murray for support of this 
assertion.561 This denial to Blacks of full participation in the moral, 
poli tical, social, and economic offering argued for years as derived from 
the text of the Constitution is regrettable, in light of the extent to which 
481 H. A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South (1967); J .G. Van 
Deusen, The Black Man in White America 159-177 (1938). 
, 
491 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
501 Missouri ex reI. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
511 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also, Weaver, Race Restrictive 
Housing Covenants, 20 J. Land and Public Utility Economics 183 (1944). 
521 Loving v. Virgnia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967). 
53 I Steel v. Louisville &. Nashville Railroad, 323 U. S. 192 (1944). 
541 Lcmbard v. Louisiana, 373 U. s. 267 (1963). 
551 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966). 
561 P. Murray, States Laws on Race and Color (1950); P. Murray, Song in a 
weary Throat 284-290 (1987) (describes how states laws on race and color came 
about. ) See also, P. Murray, It Consti tutional law and Black Wanen," American 
Law and the Black Ccmnuni ty Viewed by Black Women Lawyer, Afro-American 
Studies Program, Boston Uni versi ty, Occasional Paper No.1, at 33 (1973). 
Snith, Black Bar Associations and Civil Rights, 15 Creighton L. Rev. 651, 
667 (1982). 
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Blacks have defended this nation on the battlefields of the world.57/ 
H. 
~ Toward the Twe~ty-First Century ~t 
, 
1 
The bicentennial of the United States Constitution is here. All 
Americans can and should reflect upon the values embodied in this instru-
ment of rule. The Constitution deserves the support of American citizens. 
The bicentennial will present an excellent opportunity for Black Americans 
to review the pages of constitutional history that has denied them the 
right of full citizenship in their country, as well as those pages of 
constitutional history that they have written, corrected and re-written. 
The question facing Blacks in Cblonial America remains unanswered today: 
What direction will the interpretation of the United States Constitution 
take in order to obtain, secure and protect the rights of Black Americans? 
As we focus our Sights on the Twenty-First Century, hopefully, this 
nation~will forever revere and never retreat from the intrinsic worth, 
embodied in the principle that all persons are created equal, and the prin-
ciple that all of humankind is originally and legally free. 
57/ Houston, Critical Summary: The Negro In the U.S. AImed Forces In World 
Wars I and II, 12 J. Negro Ed. 364 (1943); Hastie, Negro Officers In Two 
World Wars, 12 J. Negro Ed. 316 (1943); K. Miller, History of the World War for 
HtUDaIl Rights, 439 (1919). I. H. lee, Negro Medal of Honor Men 139-142 (1969). 
